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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has suffered seri-ous setbacks since it entered into force in 1970. For example, 
some nuclear states like Pakistan, India 
and Israel have refused to sign it. More to 
the detriment of nonproliferation was the 
North Korean withdrawal from the NPT 
and Pyongyang’s test of a nuclear device. 
And Iran’s aspiration to produce low en-
riched uranium (LEU) on its territory has 
been regarded by the majority of parties 
involved in the dispute over the Islamic 
Republic’s nuclear program as an intention 
to build nuclear weapons. This continues 
to aggravate nonproliferation efforts and 
adversely affects Middle East politics. 
Turkish foreign-policy makers, conscious 
of the actual effects and possible implica-
tions of the inauspicious developments 
over the nuclear dispute, and weary of 
consequences potentially inimical to Turk-
ish interests, have demonstrated notable 
diplomatic involvement in the dispute.  
 Iran’s nuclear program continues to be 
one of the world’s most polarized issues.  
A regional conflagration is a grave possi-
bility, exacerbated by successive estimates 
of the time frame for Tehran’s acquisition 
of its first nuclear device. The Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) 
“Dossier on Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and 
Biological Capabilities” asserts that it may 
be soon. This report, published in February 
2011, is a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s 
quest for dual-use nuclear technologies.  
The IISS estimates that “it would take 
Iran at least two years to produce a single 
nuclear weapon.”1
 Similar worries are shared by the 
director of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), General Yukiya Amano, 
who reported the agency’s concern about 
the military dimension of the Iranian 
nuclear program to its Board of Governors 
on November 8, 2011.2 This report has 
revived the debate about Iran’s nuclear 
program. Numerous arms-control and non-
proliferation experts have voiced warnings 
that Iran may follow the North Korean 
model, which may represent a template 
for other non-nuclear-weapons countries. 
Mark Fitzpatrick argues that “the real les-
son Iran learned from North Korea is that 
brinkmanship brings rewards.”3 Through 
testing a nuclear device, North Korea 
gained a bargaining chip.  It threatened to 
launch its missile against its adversaries if 
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necessary.  North Korea has paid no appar-
ent price for withdrawing from the NPT,4 
leading experts to assume that Iran might 
well behave in the same manner.
 The Turkish concern is that, should the 
Iranian regime decide to acquire nuclear 
capabilities, it would be almost impos-
sible to reverse proliferation in the Middle 
East. Other states would aspire to such 
capabilities,5 the international nuclear 
nonproliferation regime would come to 
an end, and regional politics would be 
destabilized. This runs counter to Turkish 
diplomacy in the Middle East, which has 
encouraged stability and order. However, 
Tehran’s insistence on the peaceful nature 
of its nuclear program has militated against 
Turkish diplomacy.
 Whether Iran intends to build a nuclear 
weapon or only to generate electricity is a 
question to be answered before the situa-
tion escalates further. Iranian officials in 
Turkey, such as Farhad Kerimian, maintain 
that the Iranian nuclear program is solely 
for the generation of electricity.6 However, 
doubts remain in the international commu-
nity. There is a widespread conviction that 
Iran has been misinforming the interna-
tional community about the issue since 
2002, when two unaccounted-for nuclear 
facilities were discovered in Iran by the 
IAEA with the assistance of an Iranian op-
position group.7 At that time, the uranium 
facility at Natanz was under construction, 
and the Arak water-production plant had 
been completed.8 The IAEA investigation 
concluded that Iran had pursued secret ura-
nium enrichment programs for more than a 
decade and that its “policy of concealment” 
and “many breaches” of the NPT Safeguard 
Agreement illustrated that it had not met its 
treaty obligations.9 The latest IAEA report 
also suggests that there is a military dimen-
sion to the Iranian nuclear program. 
 Ankara’s response to the dispute has 
been the promotion of a non-military 
multilateral diplomatic solution.  This is 
no selfless act. It typifies “a commitment 
toward using a multilateral framework as 
a means to further the interests of the par-
ticular state, rather than toward the better-
ment of the collective group as a whole.”10 
Turkish policy makers have developed 
the conviction that the Turkish interests 
jeopardized by the uneasy dispute over 
the Iranian nuclear program can best be 
protected through active Turkish involve-
ment.  However, unilateral involvement 
in so sensitive an issue is certain to be as 
diplomatically futile and perhaps strategi-
cally counterproductive as non-involve-
ment. Accordingly, Turkish diplomacy has 
been directed towards the promotion of a 
multilateral settlement.  In line with this 
objective, Turkey has shifted the role it has 
assumed from observer to facilitator, and 
from facilitator to mediator.
A CHANGING PERSPECTIVE 
 Despite the fact that the Iranian nuclear 
issue had been a priority on the interna-
tional agenda since the mid-1990s, Turkey 
remained indifferent towards it for many 
years.11 It was rarely addressed before 
2005, and then Turkey was supportive of 
Iran’s right to develop its own nuclear pro-
gram. The Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) leadership has been defending Iran’s 
right to develop peaceful nuclear technolo-
gy,12 a position unequivocally shared by the 
members of the party. For instance, AKP 
parliamentarian Ahmet İnal, who served 
two terms on the board of directors of the 
parliament’s Turkish-Iranian Friendship 
Committee, stresses Iran’s right to advance 
its nuclear knowledge and technology.13 
Taking the official party position further, 
AKP parliamentarian İhsan Arslan argues 
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has stated that, if all obstacles could be 
removed, the world’s 57 Muslim countries 
as a group would have the potential to be 
self-sufficient.19 This general attitude is 
not independent of the changing social and 
political texture of Turkey. Soner Çağaptay 
asserts that “religion remained the salient 
national identity during the Ottoman peri-
od,”20 and it is again  becoming important, 








themselves as Muslim rather than Turkish 
increased by 10 percent between 2002 and 
2007 and continues to increase daily.21 In 
this sense, as Kibaroğlu observes, “The 
debate — concerning the Iranian nuclear 
program — is rather emotional, reactive to 
daily events, and also partly ideological.”22
 Before 2002, while Turkey was es-
sentially ignoring the Iranian issue, the 
United States was considering contain-
ment measures, and the EU countries were 
trying to solve the dispute through diplo-
matic means, adopting an engagement and 
negotiation strategy.23 Russia and China, 
on the other hand, were improving their 
ties with Iran, assisting Tehran not only 
to advance its nuclear program but also to 
develop its long-range missile technology. 
After 2002, Turkey’s security elite began 
to grow uneasy about Iran’s nuclear and 
missile programs but still chose not to be-
come involved in attempts at negotiation, 
preferring to adopt a wait-and-see policy.  
With the advent of the AKP government, 
Turkey has shifted from an observer to a 
facilitator, and then to a mediator. 
that Iran has every right to acquire nuclear 
capabilities.14 This attitude seems not to be 
confined to the AKP.  Former Minister of 
State Vehbi Dinçerler, who served under 
the Motherland Party (ANAP), also states 
that Iran has the right to “go nuclear.” 15 
 Many factors have led AKP to support 
Iran’s nuclear program, despite its regular 
statements that militarization of the nuclear 








an relations.  As early as July 1996, under 
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the 
two countries signed a $23 billion natural-
gas deal. Stephen Larrabee affirms that, 
since then, energy ties between Ankara 
and Tehran have continued to strengthen.16 
Still, the current status of bilateral energy 
ties is unsatisfactory for AKP officials. Ac-
cording to Suat Kınıklıoğlu, former chief 
of the AKP foreign-relations committee, 
the relationship between the two countries 
needs to be improved in the energy sec-
tor, since Turkey imports approximately 
12 percent of its natural gas from Iran 
and cannot afford chilly relations with a 
potential supplier.17 Additionally, “bilateral 
trade has risen to unpredictable levels, 
new energy-transportation deals have been 
made and others have been negotiated.”18 
 Second, it can be argued that AKP’s 
religious roots have contributed to the 
country’s improved relations with Iran. For 
Turkish foreign-policy makers, the “Mus-
lim World” in itself is a peculiar geopoliti-
cal region in which Turkey can assume 
a primary role.  Prime Minister Erdoğan 
The number of people identifying 
themselves as Muslim rather than Turkish 
increased by 10 percent between 2002 and 
2007 and continues to increase daily.
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the region’s stability and security.27 This 
apprehension induced Turkey to abandon 
its observer role and become a facilitator. 
Iranian policy makers agreed to Turkey’s 
facilitating role so long as Turkey seemed 
favorable to Iran’s position, as an Iranian 
official in Turkey openly admitted.28 Help-
ing the parties reach a settlement through 
negotiations would liberate Turkey from its 
difficult balancing act and likely preclude 
military conflict and the isolation of Iran 
through a unilateral embargo by the United 
States or multilateral sanctions by the Se-
curity Council. Turkish efforts failed, how-
ever, to bring about the desired outcome. 
Still, Turkish expectations persisted. 
FROM FACILITATOR TO 
MEDIATOR
 In late 2008, Turkey’s stance with 
respect to the Iranian nuclear issue changed 
once again. After an official visit to the 
United States, Erdogan proclaimed that 
Turkey could mediate between Iran and the 
United States based on its earlier experi-
ence of negotiating with Iran.29 U.S. Sec-
retary of State Hillary Clinton “embraced 
Turkey’s bid for the mediator position”30 
and announced that the Obama administra-
tion would request Turkey’s assistance to 
engage with Iran on the unresolved dis-
pute. Mohamed ElBaradei, then the IAEA 
director general, also asked for Turkey’s 
diplomatic support to convince Iran to 
return to the table. Having concluded that 
Turkey’s interests would be well served by 
responding favorably to these calls, Ankara 
began exchanging messages with Iranian 
officials and sending Turkish diplomats to 
Tehran. Nonetheless, Turkish officials had 
a difficult time persuading their Iranian 
counterparts to resume negotiations. Namik 
Tan, Turkish ambassador to the United 
States, noted that it was “the Persians who 
FROM OBSERVER TO 
FACILITATOR
 In 2002, the disclosure of the nuclear 
facilities at Natanz and Arak undermined 
the European Union’s negotiating approach, 
bringing the EU closer to sending the issue 
to the UN Security Council, as the United 
States had insisted.  Thereafter “the emer-
gence of a hardline political leadership in 
Iran under Mahmoud Ahmedinejad” made 
the issue more acute, exacerbated by his 
pugnacious public statements, for example, 
that Israel should be “wiped off the map.”24 
 The United States was weighing alter-
natives that, “alongside rumors, stretch[ed] 
from imposing various kinds of embargos 
to unilateral military attack.”25 Washington 
continuously urged Turkish officials to co-
operate with their Western allies in finding 
a comprehensive resolution to the problem 
in conformity with U.S. conditions for a 
satisfactory settlement of the dispute. With 
Turkey seeking to restore relations with the 
United States, which had been seriously 
damaged over the invasion of Iraq, it was 
quite challenging for the AKP officials to 
overlook the U.S. proposition. By 2005, 
various Turkish government and military 
officials as well as diplomats had publicly 
stated their concerns regarding the Iranian 
nuclear program. Finally, in Turkey’s Na-
tional Security Policy Document of 2005, 
the Iranian nuclear program was acknowl-
edged as a hot-button issue.26
 Turkey had tried not to side with the 
United States or Iran, but the deadlock 
remained. If an aggressive approach of 
containment and isolation was instigated 
by Washington, it would force Turkey to 
choose between the parties. Turkish of-
ficials were concerned that, as had hap-
pened with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a 
military confrontation between the United 
States and Iran would adversely affect 
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purposes.”35 Accordingly, three days later, 
a new round of UN sanctions was leveled 
against Iran. 36 Frustrated, Turkey voted 
against the sanctions, claiming it would 
lose credibility otherwise.37 
 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Da-
vutoglu claimed that the Vienna Group’s 
rejection of the swap deal denied Iran’s 







Israel is not 
part of the 
NPT, and al-
though it has 
not tested a nuclear device or a weapon, it 
is assumed to have them.38 The AKP gov-
ernment not only criticized Israel’s nuclear 
arsenal, but also the “U.S. tacit approval of 
it.”39 The common conviction in Turkish 
public opinion was that the Western coun-
tries hesitated to “recognize Iran’s right to 
develop peaceful nuclear energy because 
they wish[ed] to maintain their monopoly 
of nuclear energy.”40 Public “reaction to 
the Western countries reflected Turkish 
officials’ disappointment with U.S. and 
European officials, who had encouraged 
Turkey to persuade Iran to compromise 
over the swap agreement.”41 However, of-
ficials from the Turkish Foreign Ministry 
acknowledge that the lack of coordination 
between Ankara and Washington during 
the negotiation process42 would have con-
tributed to the negative outcome.
 In April 2011 in Istanbul, Turkey once 
again tried to mediate multilateral talks on 
Iran’s nuclear program. During the meet-
ings, EU High Representative of Foreign 
Affairs Catherine Ashton presented the 5+1 
invented the game of chess — it took two 
18-hour days to get their cooperation.” 31 
 In the end, in October 2009, a uranium 
fuel-swap agreement between the 5+1 
countries (the Security Council plus Ger-
many) and Iran was discussed in Vienna. 
ElBaradei proposed placing Iran’s low-
enriched uranium (LEU) in Turkey’s cus-
tody in exchange for the Vienna Group’s 
supplying 
Iran with 








States. After a letter from President Obama 
to Erdogan about it in October 2009, Tur-
key continued to try to bring Iran on board. 
 In May 2010, Iran agreed to have its 
uranium enriched in Turkey. Turkey and 
Brazil, the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council at the time, had negoti-
ated the deal with Iran32 as the Security 
Council was about to vote on a sanctions 
package. Jim Walsh notes that, from Oc-
tober 2009 to April 2010, Iranian officials 
had stalled, not wanting to give up their 
uranium.  When they received the intel-
ligence that Russia and China were going 
to vote in favor of the sanctions, however, 
they decided to sign, though reluctantly.33 
Despite Tehran’s decision to abide by the 
agreement, the Security Council expressed 
its disapproval, because the deal did not 
address the issue of LEU produced during 
the time between the two deals, 20 percent 
of which would remain in Iran.34 The deal 
was considered only “a tactical move on 
Iran’s part, to illustrate that it was will-
ing to use its nuclear material for peaceful 
The common conviction in Turkish public 
opinion was that the Western countries 
hesitated to “recognize Iran’s right to 
develop peaceful nuclear energy because 
they wish[ed] to maintain their monopoly 
of nuclear energy.”
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 The Istanbul meeting was regarded as 
a historic opportunity by both the Iranian 
and Turkish officials as well as academ-
ics,45 but it ended inconclusively. Several 
observers had anticipated such an outcome. 
Henri J. Barkey, for example, affirms that 
“both sides are playing a game in which 
the object is to pretend to the audience 
— the rest of the world — that they mean 
well.”46 Many experts have since argued 
that the intention of Iranian policy makers 
was to buy time by feigning optimism. 
 Tehran’s alleged insincerity may have 
resulted from the continuing covert activi-
ties against Iran’s nuclear program and the 
unceasing warnings from the international 
community. The IISS report, for instance, 
concludes that it would take Iran at least 
two years to produce a single nuclear 
device, matching American assessments of 
the time frame and offering a detailed tech-
nical analysis of the situation. On the other 
hand, industrial sabotage attempts have 
somewhat decelerated the progression of 
Iran’s nuclear program.47 In November 
2010, the Iranian government acknowl-
edged that the Stuxnet computer worm had 
infected some centrifuges, and, in Decem-
ber, the IAEA inspectors confirmed that 
984 of Iran’s centrifuges had been taken 
offline. Gholamreza Jalali, Iran’s passive-
defense-system director, said that Stuxnet 
“still posed a  potential risk…and that [a] 
new virus, named ‘Stars,’ was being inves-
tigated.”48 Simply put, there is a cyber war 
targeting Iran’s nuclear program.
 Although there is still time for the par-
ties to continue confidence-building mea-
sures and to pursue a diplomatic resolution 
to the dispute, the latest IAEA report has 
raised further questions in the international 
community by fomenting the concern that 
the Iranian program actually has a military 
dimension. There is the widespread opin-
countries’ plan to improve the transparency 
of the Iranian nuclear program.  Included 
was an updated version of the uranium 
fuel-exchange agreement.  Iranian officials 
came to the meeting with two precondi-
tions. First, they requested that the Security 
Council lift its sanctions before the negoti-
ation process started. This request was, not 
surprisingly, denied. Further, the Security 
Council had selected a panel of specialists 
in November 2010 to evaluate the repercus-
sions of the sanctions to determine whether 
to strengthen them. Iran was likely expect-
ing to capitalize on the reluctance of Russia 
and China to take part in the sanctions, but 
this approach failed. 
 Iran’s second condition was that the 
United Nations acknowledge Iran’s right 
to make LEU on its territory, one of its 
constant refrains. Article IV of the NPT 
acknowledges the right of a state to “use 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” on 
the condition that it remain transparent 
about its nuclear program and not engage 
in proliferation. However, the international 
community was convinced that Iran had 
continually violated these commitments.  
This conviction was affirmed in April 
2011, when Tehran verified that it had been 
constructing uranium-enrichment centri-
fuge parts at the Taba plant.43 
 Despite this disclosure, Iran continues 
to argue that it has not violated the NPT.  
Iran’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Ka-
zim Gharib Abadi, argues that “all nuclear 
activities are under direct supervision of 
the IAEA, and there has not been any kind 
of diversion to non-peaceful purposes. You 
cannot find any report or acknowledge-
ment on behalf of the IAEA that Iran has a 
nuclear-weapons program.”44 Despite the 
many IAEA documents on Iran’s misin-
forming of the IAEA, Iranian officials still 
claim full cooperation with the agency.
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with Russia, bolster economic and secu-
rity ties with Tehran, create cooperation 
schemes in the surrounding regions, and 
normalize political relations with neigh-
bors were the most indicative manifesta-
tions of the new thinking.”52 We argue that, 
in congruence with its proactive foreign 
policy, Turkey’s involvement in the Iranian 
nuclear program is yet another attempt to 










ish policy makers, possessing the capacity 
to solve problems in the neighborhood and 
demonstrating the ability to do so bespeaks 
autonomy in foreign policy, an indication 
of great-power status. The shift in Turkey’s 
role fits the general pattern of diplomatic 
mediation efforts. Still, the larger purpose 
is to demonstrate strategic autonomy.
 Turkey’s contribution to finding a final 
settlement to the Iranian dispute palat-
able to all the parties has failed to yield a 
satisfactory result thus far. For one thing, 
it seems that Ankara has yet to appreciate 
the significance of the way it is perceived. 
Despite not being a party to the dispute, 
Turkey is not insulated from repercussions 
of the developments over it.  This gives 
Turkey a vested interest in its settlement or 
continuation.  As a corollary, Ankara’s im-
partiality in its efforts to mediate nuclear 
negotiations for an acceptable settlement 
becomes questionable, no matter how 
much Turkish policy makers insist other-
wise. In addition, Ankara’s policy of “dual 
appeasement” in its involvement in Iran’s 
ion among Turkish policy makers that Teh-
ran is only trying to buy time and exploit 
AKP good will.49 Former AKP parliamen-
tarian Murat Mercan, the former president 
of the Council of European Parliamentary 
Assembly (PACE), asserts that during his 
negotiations with Iranian officials such as 
Ali Larijani, speaker of the Majles, and 
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of the 
committee on foreign policy and security, 









perspective and that their culture, history 
and society make it hard to reach a mutu-
ally acceptable solution with them.50 
FAILURE OF APPEASEMENT
 The transformation of the roles Turkey 
has assumed in its diplomacy over the 
Iranian nuclear program can be explained 
with reference to the Turkish interests 
jeopardized by the dispute. While Turkey’s 
security policy is adversely affected, its 
economic interests, especially commercial 
activities with and in Iran, have become 
increasingly vulnerable.
 Nevertheless, the shift in Turkey’s 
roles from observer to facilitator and then 
mediator can only be partially explained 
with reference to Turkish interests. This 
shift is also about Turkey’s quest for stra-
tegic autonomy in foreign policy. As Şaban 
Kardaş has argued, “At the core of Tur-
key’s regional policy has been its leaders’ 
ceaseless search for stra tegic autonomy.”51 
To Kardaş, “Ankara’s efforts to develop 
a nascent multi-dimensional partnership 
Turkey’s involvement in the Iranian 
nuclear program is yet another attempt to 
actualize “strategic autonomy” through 
the augmentation of its problem-solving 
capacity and the demonstration of its 
problem-solving ability.
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NATO’s missile-defense system56 only 
after lengthy negotiations and that Turkey 
insisted on not naming Iran as a threat in 
NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted in 
Lisbon on November 19, 2010.57 
 Moreover, although Turkey voted 
against the Security Council resolution that 
adopted sanctions on Iran in July 2010, 
Iran is still concerned with the agreement 
Turkey signed with the United States to 
station U.S. missile-defense radar in Kure-
cik, some 700 kilometers (435 miles) west 
of the Iranian border. Turkish policy mak-
ers such as AKP parliamentarian Hasan 
Fehmi Kinay were quick to point out that 
this radar was already in use and thus is 
just going to restart functioning.58 The 
Turkish government has tried not to create 
a rift with Iran on this issue. However, 
President Ahmadinejad has asserted that 
“the defense system was meant to protect 
Israel against Iranian missile attacks in 
the event a war breaks out with the Jewish 
state.”59 In additioin, and causing a high 
degree of indignation in Turkey, General 
Amir Ali Hajizadeh has declared that “if 
any threat is staged against Iran, we will 
target NATO’s missile shield in Turkey and 
will then attack other targets.”60
A MULTILATERAL APPROACH
 For Turkey to be an effective media-
tor between its Western allies and Iran, a 
precondition is Tehran’s genuine desire to 
engage in dialogue with the 5+1 states.  So 
far, despite numerous attempts, Tehran has 
not given an impression of such willing-
ness. As William Tobey states, the propos-
als “seem to have done more to highlight 
Iran’s intransigence than to resolve the 
issue.”61 In contrast to the Bush admin-
istration, which categorically rejected 
dialogue with Iran and sought to isolate the 
regime, the Obama administration has at 
nuclear program has been futile.  This is 
mainly due to the fact that success is only 
possible when the parties voluntarily re-
frain from escalation during negotiations.  
Turkey does not possess enough leverage 
over the parties to dissuade them from tak-
ing escalatory actions. 
 Finally, a policy of dual appeasement 
is certain to fail if a mediator experiences 
its own problems with one of the parties.  
Ankara’s relations with Tehran have been 
plagued by several problems that have 
militated against its diplomacy.  First, the 
changing dynamics in the Middle East as 
a result of the Arab Spring and Turkey’s 
decision to be part of NATO’s missile-de-
fense system have had repercussions. The 
Arab Spring has eroded relations between 
Ankara and Tehran.  Events in Syria, in 
particular, seem to have created new rifts 
between Turkey and Iran. The fall of the 
Asad regime would weaken the influence 
of Tehran in Syria and possibly in Leba-
non, leading to Iran’s eventual isolation 
in the region. Such a diplomatic retreat is 
likely to be exploited by Ankara. 
 Second, Turkey and Iran are neighbors 
to Iraq.  The two regional powers are still 
competing for influence in that strategic 
country,53 despite the fact that they have 
been cooperating in fields like counter-
terrorism, drug trafficking and stability 
promotion.  However,  in the wake of the 
U.S. troop withdrawal, Turkey and Iran are 
competing to fill the power vacuum.54
 Third, Turkey’s decision to be part of 
the missile-defense architecture deployed 
by NATO has caused notable friction 
between Ankara and Tehran. Even though, 
in 2007, Turkey began seeking to develop 
its own national missile-defense program,55 
the recent decision has created rifts be-
tween the two.  Iran has apparently forgot-
ten that Turkey agreed to become part of 
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least expressed interest in a dialogue. The 
Erdogan government has tried to contrib-
ute to the effort to find a solution, largely 
without success.  But there is still hope for 
a possible solution, depending on Tehran’s 
readiness to reach a compromise by agree-
ing to supply its energy needs from an 
international uranium fuel center.
 Iran can get out of all agreements 
with reference to a legal framework that it 
can produce 







is using its right to produce electricity for 
civilian use as a way to develop a nuclear 
capability while at the same time devel-
oping ballistic missiles with increasing 
range. One can reach certain conclusions 
about Tehran’s actions, but it is important 
to note that “the Iranian government is not 
a unified monolith but a conglomerate of 
various factions with differing interests 
and views.”62 
 Those within the Iranian government 
who are open to dialogue with the 5+1 are 
apparently too politically weak for their 
views to gain acceptance. Furthermore, 
experts are divided over whether regime 
change in their favor is likely.63 Not only 
is the supreme leader’s authority being 
challenged, but the principles of velayat-e 
faqih are being questioned. It is probable 
that divisions in the Iranian leadership will 
open up against the background of the Arab 
Spring.  But power is still in the hands of 
more militant and hardline factions. 
 Larrabee contends that “the Iranian 
leadership does not want to see any recon-
ciliation with the United States: it would 
weaken their power and ability to maintain 
their political influence.”64 How can Turkey 
help resolve this controversial issue under 
these conditions? The Turkish government 
has tried to use its relationship with key 
figures in the Iranian power structure to 
work on a solution.65 However, Turkish 
officials could not come up with a deal 
acceptable to the international community 









is to encourage Iran to participate in 
international nuclear-fuel centers. 
Participating in Russian and American 
low-enriched stockpiles as well as the 
IAEA fuel bank and the UK enriched bond 
scheme, accepted by the IAEA Board of 
Governors in March 2011,66 will probably 
constitute enough nuclear fuel for global 
use, including that of Iran.67 
 If Iran is pursuing enrichment as a reli-
able source of reactor fuel, an international 
nuclear-fuel center would guarantee that the 
transportation of Russian supplies to Iran 
and other countries in need of LEU would 
not be interrupted. If Iran’s real objec-
tive is to construct a nuclear bomb, it will 
either reject the idea or only agree to it if 
the facility is located on Iranian territory, 
where, as William H. Tobey underlines, 
it would probably continue to provide a 
latent capacity.68 Nevertheless, it would 
be difficult for Ankara to convince Tehran 
to agree to the international nuclear-fuel-
centers idea.69 “The discussion of the state 
of the (extremely longstanding and com-
plicated) international debate on fuel banks 
 In the long run, instead of continuing its 
efforts to mediate between the parties, one 
option for Turkey is to encourage Iran to 
participate in international nuclear-fuel 
centers.
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this matter. However, one can argue that, 
if mediation is to no avail, after a time it 
can be regarded as futile.  The impression 
that the Turkish government’s mediation 
efforts have been misused by the Iranian 
regime just to buy time has not completely 
vanished. Economic sanctions, on the other 
hand, are discussed critically by Turkish 
policy makers, since Ankara maintains a 
desire to improve its economic relations 
with Iran. Yet, sanctions can only work if 
they are applied everywhere. Therefore, 
Turkey may need to consider joining the 
international efforts. 
 Some observers, politicians and 
scholars alike, still view Turkey as an ad-
vocate of Iran. Elliot Abrams argues that, 
if Turkey wants to help resolve the issue 
in the short term “[i]t should stand firmly 
behind [the] UN Security Council as well 
as the IAEA resolutions and urge Iran to 
comply with them.”77 Anything else, from 
the perspective of these observers, will 
diminish international unity and allow the 
Iranian regime to buy time. Gunter Verheu-
gen, the former European commissioner, 
also asserts that “the recent IAEA report 
is alarming, and something needs to be 
done,”78 arguing that the best option is for 
Ankara to join the multilateral efforts.
 It is quite understandable that the AKP 
leadership does not want to increase the  
instability of the region and is still trying 
to help solve the Iranian nuclear dispute 
by advocating dialogue and perform-
ing facilitation and mediation. This is, of 
course, the preferable option. Exhibiting a 
degree of extreme optimism, AKP parlia-
mentarians such as Dr. Idris Bal and Hasan 
Fehmi Kinay, as well as the chief of the 
Turkish Parliament Commission, Volkan 
Bozkır, still believe that the Iranian nuclear 
program is for peaceful purposes.  They 
argue that Tehran has the right to produce 
and other variations on these themes is not 
easily accomplished.”70 Hans Blix, former 
director of the IAEA, asserts that the least 
difficult path would be “states in a region 
themselves taking the initiative” to develop 
a fuel bank.71 Outside initiatives risk being 
received as pressure from the nuclear states. 
 However, Alexander Sotnichenko of 
St. Petersburg University says that the idea 
of an international fuel center is “captivat-
ing” and that the Russian government has 
been supporting this multilateral approach 
since 2006.72 American experts also support 
the idea of international fuel centers.  For 
Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford Univer-
sity, “The world will have to move in this 
direction to limit the number of fuel cycle 
facilities and increase their transparency.”73 
 The issue of centralized international 
handling of nuclear fuel has previously 
been explored from the technical and eco-
nomical aspects, always with a concern for 
nonproliferation — but it has never been 
implemented. “It is most reasonable to 
raise it again in this context.”74 The major 
challenge, also for Turkish efforts, would 
be to convince countries in the developing 
world that international fuel-cycle develop-
ment would not result in their dependence 
on the major powers for nuclear fuel. 
Therefore, Charles D. Ferguson states, “A 
multinational fuel facility may be built in a 
Middle Eastern country or some country in 
the developing world in order to show that 
these states have access to the fuel cycle 
in that part of the world.”75 In attempts to 
resolve Iran’s nuclear issue, “persistence 
and creativity are clearly needed.”76
 Notwithstanding its increased involve-
ment in the Iranian nuclear dispute, Tur-
key’s attempts to resolve the issue have 
been unsuccessful so far.  Foreign Minister 
Davutoglu is willing to perform whatever 
role Turkey ought to assume to resolve 
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same token, Gürsel Demirok, a retired 
Turkish diplomat and the director-in-chief 
of research and development at the Turkish 
National Security Council, does not think 
the IAEA report will change the Turkish 
position.  Demirok reaffirms that Turkey’s 
attempts to resolve the issue have been 
unsuccessful so far, but is still optimistic 
that Turkey can facilitate dialogue between 
Iran and the international community by 
mediation. 
 Turkey will never return to being an 
observer.  Its involvement with the Iranian 
nuclear program is yet another attempt to 
actualize “strategic autonomy” by aug-
menting its problem-solving capacity. 
To Turkish policy makers, being able to 
solve problems in the vicinity of Turkey 
bespeaks autonomy in its foreign policy, 
an indication of great-power status. As the 
reasoning goes, no problem in the geo-
strategic area identified with Turkey can 
be solved without Turkish involvement. 
In order to reach such strategic autonomy, 
however, Turkey has to prove it can settle 
disputes in its vicinity, the major one being 
that of Iranian nuclear capabilities.
nuclear energy and to possess nuclear 
technology, even though there is some 
criticism among AKP politicians that the 
Iranian regime does not appreciate Turkish 
efforts to support Iran’s nuclear program. 
AKP parliamentarians add that nuclear 
technology should not be monopolized by 
nuclear-weapons states. 
 In terms of Ankara’s relations with 
the other party to the dispute, it is asserted 
that President Obama and Prime Minister 
Erdogan have been in close contact since 
January 2011. Soner Çağaptay  indicates 
that President Obama and Prime Minister 
Erdogan give great importance to constant 
consultations and are trying to be in close 
cooperation through direct telephone dis-
cussions.79 The failure of the nuclear-swap 
agreement may actually have led the two 
governments into full coordination, so that 
another attempt will not fail.
 The Turkish government, on the other 
hand, seems to underestimate the possibil-
ity that the Israeli government may decide 
to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.80 For-
eign Minister Davutoglu has consistently 
refused to discuss such an option.  By the 
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